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OPINION OF THE COURT 
                     
 
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
 In this case, we are asked to examine the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service's ("INS") policy of placing upon 
common carriers the burden of detaining stowaways who have 
applied for asylum in the United States.  In brief, we conclude 
that the provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act 
("INA") lack the requisite clarity which would justify the policy 
as it presently has been established.  In light of the statutory 
ambiguity and of the characteristics of the INS policy, we 
believe that the policy constitutes a legislative rule which 
could only have been promulgated pursuant to the notice and 
comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). 
For this reason, we conclude that the District Court improperly 
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dismissed the appellant's complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). 
We further find that the district court improperly denied 
appellant's motion for summary judgment insofar as it sought a 
judgment declaring that the INS policy on detention of stowaways 
who have applied for asylum is invalid for failure to comply with 
the notice and comment procedures of the APA.  We do find, 
however, that the district court properly dismissed appellant's 
other claims, including its claim for reimbursement of the 
expenses it incurred in detaining the stowaways involved in this 
case.1  We will, therefore, reverse in part and affirm in part 
the order of the district court and we will remand this case to 
the district court to enter judgment in favor of appellant 
consistent with this opinion. 
I. 
 Appellant Dia Navigation Company, Ltd., ("Dia") is a 
Cyprus corporation which owns the M/V European Senator 
("Senator"), an ocean carrier which transports commercial cargo 
between the United States and Europe.  On February 13, 1993, four 
Romanian stowaways were found aboard the Senator while it was en 
route from Le Havre, France, to the Port of Newark, New Jersey. 
The stowaways were presented to and interviewed by an INS 
inspection officer upon arrival in Newark on February 21, 1992. 
None of the four Romanians had proper identification for entry 
into the United States.  The INS officer verified that they were 
                                                           
1Because the stowaways involved in this case have now either been 
deported or granted asylum, we do not reach appellant's claim for 
injunctive relief.  
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in fact stowaways, which meant that they were subject to 
deportation without an exclusion hearing.  However, each of the 
stowaways requested political asylum. 
 Under existing INS policy, the carrier on which a 
stowaway arrives must pay the expenses of detaining him for as 
long as it takes the INS to process his asylum claim. 
Accordingly, the INS officer presented the ship's master with a 
Form I-259 "Notice to Detain, Deport, Remove or Present Aliens." 
The form provided that "[p]ursuant to the provisions of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, and the Regulations issued by 
the Attorney General thereunder," App. at 25, the aliens were to 
be detained on board the ship.  A notation on the form read: 
"CARRIER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DETENTION[,] TRANSPORTATION AND 
WELFARE OF THE ALIEN UNTIL OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED BY USINS."  Id. 
The form was presumably accompanied by some indication by the 
officer that Dia could detain the stowaways off the ship pending 
the processing of their asylum claims. 
 Dia complied with INS's orders, housing the stowaways 
in two rooms at the Staten Island Holiday Inn and hiring armed 
guards to maintain one guard per stowaway around the clock.2 
During the detention, one of the detainees began a hunger strike 
and threatened to commit suicide.  To prevent this, the guards 
placed him in a separate room and put him in leg irons.  Faced 
                                                           
2According to Dia, if it had refused to assume the detention 
costs, the Senator would have been prevented from entry into or 
departure from the Port of Newark.  
5 
with this situation, Dia requested that INS assume custody of 
this detainee; INS refused to do so. 
 Furthermore, because INS would not convene a hearing on 
the asylum claims until it had received completed asylum 
applications, Dia had to hire a Romanian interpreter to help with 
preparation of the forms and to assist at the asylum hearings. 
Ultimately two of the stowaways' asylum requests were granted; 
the other stowaways were flown back to Romania at Dia's expense.3  
In the end, the Romanians were detained for a total of 54 days.  
Dia claims to have incurred $127,580 in detention-related 
expenses. 
 At this point we pause to note that the processing of 
asylum applications often takes a considerable amount of time. 
Indeed, the proceedings in this case appear to have been 
relatively speedy.  Dia cites a General Accounting Office report 
which indicates that in the period from 1986 to 1989 the average 
amount of time required to process an asylum application ranged 
from 5.8 months in San Francisco to 31.2 months in Chicago. 
General Accounting Office, Report to Congress:  Immigration 
Management 49 (1991).  Moreover, our attention has been directed 
to no set standards, in the form of regulations or otherwise, 
concerning the conditions under which such aliens are detained. 
Instead, INS apparently claims the discretion to order whatever 
measures and impose whatever conditions of detention it deems 
appropriate.  In a hearing before the district court, counsel for 
                                                           
3Dia does not contest having been required to pay the return 
travel expenses of the deported stowaways. 
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INS claimed that INS could require carriers to detain stowaways 
for any period of time, without limitation.  App. at 131-34, 136-
38.  In response to this assertion, the district court judge 
inquired:  "You can have [an INS officer] who has a bad day and 
says, I want two guards on this guy 24 hours a day, I want him 
put in the Plaza, I want him given gourmet meals, and you're 
telling me that th[e] vessel owner can't say a thing about that, 
right?"  Counsel for the INS simply responded, "Yes."  App. at 
165. 
 On March 30, 1993, Dia filed suit under 28 U.S.C. §2201 
seeking 1) a declaratory judgment that the INS policy requiring 
an ocean carrier to both detain stowaways who have applied for 
political asylum and be responsible for those stowaways' 
attendant detention costs and expenses was unlawful and void and 
2) an injunction to prohibit the INS from enforcing or attempting 
to enforce the policy.  Dia contended that the INS violated the 
INA, including the User Fee provisions, the APA, and the INS's 
own regulations.  Dia further claimed a right under the APA and 
the Tucker Act to reimbursement of the expenses it had incurred 
in detaining the aliens as well as for its related expenses. 
 Defendants filed their answer to the complaint on May 
14, 1993.  On May 28, 1993, the government filed a motion to 
dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and Dia filed a motion for 
summary judgment.  On August 11, 1993, the district court granted 
the government's motion, construing it as a motion for summary 
judgment, and dismissed the complaint.  This appeal followed. 
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 Dia advances a number of arguments on appeal.  It 
contends first that the INA by its terms requires the INS to bear 
the costs of detaining stowaways who apply for asylum and that 
this court need not defer to the INS's interpretation of the 
statute.  Dia next asserts that the INS policy violates the INS's 
own regulations and that the INS's action in this case was 
arbitrary and capricious.  Dia's final attack on the INS policy, 
and the one with which we agree, is that the policy should have 
been promulgated pursuant to notice and comment rulemaking.  Dia 
also argues that the district court improperly dismissed its 
claims for monetary relief. 
II. 
 The district court had jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 702, 8 U.S.C. § 1329, and 28 U.S.C. §1331.  
We have jurisdiction over Dia's timely appeal of the final 
decision of the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our 
decision not to consider Dia's claim for injunctive relief, see 
supra note 1, does not render this appeal moot.  We must consider 
the relevant statutory provisions and their interpretation by INS 
in addressing Dia's claims for monetary relief.  See 13A Charles 
A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533.8 at 378 
(1984).  Moreover, to the extent that the claims for damages may 
not support the depth of our analysis, we believe that this case 
is among those "capable of repetition, yet evading review."  In 
such cases a finding of mootness is avoided by a determination 
that the complaining party may reasonably expect to be subject to 
the challenged activity in the future and that the challenged 
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activity is by its nature so short in duration that its validity 
could not be fully adjudicated prior to its cessation or 
termination.  See Reich v. Local 30, Int'l Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, 6 F.3d 978, 984 (3d Cir. 1993).  See also United 
States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 836-37 (3d Cir. 1994); Clark v. 
Brewer, 776 F.2d 226, 229 (8th Cir. 1985); Finberg v. Sullivan, 
634 F.2d 50, 55 (3d Cir. 1980) (in banc).  Both factors are 
present here.  The international nature of Dia's business makes 
it quite possible that it will be confronted with the problem of 
stowaways in the future.  And the amount of time required to 
process asylum applications, while lengthy, is typically less 
than would be necessary to adjudicate the validity of the INS 
policy.  Cf. ITT Rayonier v. United States, 651 F.2d 343, 346 
(5th Cir. Unit B July 1981) ("We would be most reluctant to 
permit a federal agency to so arrange its timetables that the 
scope of its authority would continue to elude judicial 
scrutiny.").  
 Because this case concerns the district court's grant 
of summary judgment, we have plenary review.  E.g., Erie 
Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1093 (3d 
Cir. 1988). 
III. 
 Under the INA, all aliens arriving in the United States 
are subject to examination and inspection by an INS inspector 
whose duty it is to determine whether they are permitted to enter 
the country.  See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1224-25; 8 C.F.R. § 235.3.  If an 
alien does not appear to be someone clearly entitled to enter--
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that is, if the INS inspector suspects that the alien is an 
"excludable" alien--he is subject to an exclusion hearing to 
determine whether he is eligible to remain.  "Excludable" aliens 
are defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a).  Stowaways are expressly 
included in the category of "excludable" aliens.  8 U.S.C. 
§1182(a)(6)(D). 
 In addition to being excludable aliens, stowaways are 
generally viewed as a disfavored category.  E.g., Yiu Sing Chun 
v. Sava, 708 F.2d 869, 875 n.21 (2d Cir. 1983).  One consequence 
of this is that, in contrast to other excludable aliens, 
stowaways are automatically subject to deportation and have no 
right to a hearing to determine their status.  The INA provides: 
The provisions of section 1225 of this title 
for detention of aliens for examination 
before special inquiry officers and the right 
of appeal provided for in section 1226 of 
this title shall not apply to aliens who 
arrive as stowaways and no such alien shall 
be permitted to land in the United States, 
except temporarily for medical treatment, or 
pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney 
General may prescribe for the ultimate 
departure or removal or deportation of such 
alien from the United States. 
8 U.S.C. § 1323(d).  Under this provision stowaways who do not 
seek political asylum are subject to immediate deportation, and 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1) the carriers on whose vessel or plane 
they arrived are responsible for returning them to the place from 
whence they came, as well as for the costs of any detention for 
the period between the issuance of the deportation/exclusion 
order and the actual departure of the stowaways. 
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 This case presents us with the question of whether and 
to what extent INS may place on carriers the additional burden of 
detaining and maintaining asylum-seeking stowaways during the 
period in which their asylum applications are pending.  The 
statutory scheme by its express terms only contemplates placing 
on carriers the cost of detaining stowaways who are subject to 
immediate deportation.  Asylum seekers cannot, however, be 
deported pending a decision on their asylum application, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1105a.  A fortiori an asylum-seeking stowaway is not subject to 
"immediate deportation" while the asylum application is under 
consideration.  Yet the INS has taken the position that it has 
the authority to parole stowaways who have applied for asylum 
into the custody of carriers, 8 C.F.R. § 253.1(f)(3), and that 
carriers may be held liable for the costs of detention and 
related services during this period.  See Legal Opinion of INS 
Acting General Counsel (January 11, 1991).  Moreover, as noted 
above, INS apparently reserves the right to impose whatever 
conditions on detention it deems appropriate.  Of these three 
rules, only the first, 8 C.F.R. § 253.1(f)(3), was adopted 
pursuant to the notice and comment provisions of the APA. 
 Prior to 1986, INS made carriers responsible for the 
detention of all excludable aliens, arriving on their planes or 
vessels, as well as for related costs.  See 8 C.F.R. §§ 233.1, 
235.3 (1986).  In imposing this requirement, INS relied on the 
provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1223.  That section provided in part:  
Whenever a temporary removal of aliens is 
made under this section, the vessels or 
aircraft or transportation lines which 
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brought them, and the masters, commanding 
officers, owners, agents, and consignees of 
the vessel, aircraft, or transportation line 
upon which they arrived shall pay all 
expenses of such removal to a designated 
place for examination and inspection or other 
place of detention and all expenses arising 
during subsequent detention, pending a 
decision on the aliens' eligibility to enter 
the United States and until they are either 
allowed to land or returned to the care of 
the transportation line or to the vessel or 
aircraft which brought them. 
8 U.S.C. § 1223 (repealed Oct. 18, 1986, 100 Stat. 1783-56). 
 Congress began to express concern about this state of 
affairs as early as 1985.  In that year the House Appropriations 
Committee noted its apprehension 
about the policy of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service which requires 
scheduled passenger airlines to assume 
custody and financial responsibility for 
aliens who arrive by plane in the United 
States without proper documentation.  The 
Committee understands that in the absence of 
Government detention facilities, air carriers 
must detain such aliens in custody and in all 
cases pay for their food and shelter.  The 
Committee believes this policy raises 
significant questions about the equity and 
legal propriety of requiring private entities 
to assume the financial burdens of 
maintaining and, at times, exercising 
physical custody over excluded aliens for 
extended periods of time.  Specifically, the 
Committee is concerned about the possible 
ramifications of detention of aliens by 
airline personnel or their agents who are 
not, of course, law enforcement officials. 
H.R. Rep. No. 197, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., at 38 (1985). 
Accordingly, the Committee requested that the INS Commissioner 
submit a report concerning the policy, which was to include a 
discussion of 
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the effect of a change in policy which would 
require the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service to assume all custodial 
responsibility when the transporting air 
carrier has demonstrated a good faith effort 
to detect inadmissibility prior to boarding. 
Id. 
 The Committee reiterated these concerns the following 
year.  It expressed 
strong support for a change in policy which 
would require the INS to assume, in all 
cases, all custodial responsibility and 
financial responsibility when the 
transporting air carriers have demonstrated a 
good faith effort to detect inadmissibility 
prior to boarding the aircraft. 
H.R. Rep. No. 669, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 35 (1986). 
 In 1986, Congress repealed § 1223 and enacted the User 
Fee Statute.  Consistent with the congressional concerns outlined 
above, one of the new statute's primary functions was to reverse 
the existing rule, requiring carriers to bear the expenses of 
detaining aliens pending hearings on their immigration status. 
The Conference Report, accompanying the bill, described the 
relevant provision as follows: 
Provides language proposed by the Senate 
which would release scheduled passenger 
airlines and vessels from the responsibility 
to assume custody or financial responsibility 
for aliens who arrive by plane or commercial 
vessel in the U.S. without proper 
documentation.  The House bill contained no 
provision on this matter. 
H.R. Rep. No. 1005, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 421 (1986).  The 
statute created a User Fee Account, financed by a five dollar 
surcharge on the tickets of international passengers and by civil 
fines collected by INS.  The money from the account is to be used 
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to refund the Attorney General "for expenses incurred by the 
Attorney General in ... providing detention and deportation 
services for excludable aliens arriving on commercial aircraft 
and vessels."  8 U.S.C. § 1356(h)(2)(A)(v) (emphasis added). 
Neither the statute nor its legislative history suggest any 
distinctions between the various categories of "excludable" 
aliens for purposes of this reallocation of the burdens of 
detention. 
 As noted above, INS has promulgated a rule, pursuant to 
notice and comment, in which, despite the User Fee Statute, it 
has interpreted the INA to authorize it, as one option, to parole 
stowaways who have requested asylum into the custody of the 
carrier.  "Pending adjudication of the application by the Asylum 
Officer, the applicant may be detained by the [INS], or paroled 
into the custody of the ship's agent or otherwise paroled in 
accordance with § 212.5 of this chapter ... ."  8 C.F.R. 
§253.1(f)(3).  As the following discussion of the statute will 
reveal, this is a permissible reading of the INA to which we must 
defer under the doctrine of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 
L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).  Thus we are concerned here only with the 
question of responsibility for the costs of detention and its 
incidents4 and the related issue of the lack of any standards 
governing detention by carriers. 
                                                           
4The question of who bears responsibility for the costs of 
detention is distinct from the question of who is responsible for 
taking custody of stowaways.  For example, on at least two 
occasions INS has taken stowaways into its custody without 
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 Dia argues that, under the User Fee Statute, INS is 
required to pay for the detention expenses of stowaways who 
request asylum.  It relies primarily on the fact that stowaways 
are expressly defined as "excludable" aliens in § 1182(a)(6)(D), 
as well as the User Fee Statute's unqualified reference to the 
Attorney General's bearing the costs of detention of excludable 
aliens.  In support of this reading it points to the similarly 
unqualified language of the legislative history, which also 
suggests that Congress did not intend to distinguish between 
stowaways and other excludable aliens in shifting the costs of 
detention to INS.  Dia acknowledges that stowaways who do not 
request asylum are subject to immediate deportation under 
§1323(d) and that under § 1227(a)(1) carriers are responsible for 
the costs of their deportation (including detention incident to 
deportation) but contends that because those that seek asylum are 
entitled to a hearing on that request INS should pay detention 
costs while the hearing is pending. 
 The government argues, and the district court found, 
that § 1323(d) makes stowaways a de facto class of "excluded" 
aliens.  Although there is no explicit statutory basis for this 
categorization, the district court began its analysis by 
observing that stowaways are subject to immediate deportation 
with no hearing.  It then looked to the language of § 1227(a)(1), 
which provides that "[a]ny alien ... arriving in the United 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
relieving carriers from liability for the expense of doing so. 
See Legal Opinion of INS Acting General Counsel at 2 n.1, 6 
(January 11, 1991).  And in this case Dia argues that INS should 
reimburse it for the costs incurred in detaining the stowaways. 
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States who is excluded under this chapter, shall be immediately 
deported ... unless the Attorney General, in an individual case, 
in his discretion, concludes that immediate deportation is not 
practicable or proper."  From this analysis, the district court 
understood "excluded" as "a de facto category of aliens termed 
'excluded' aliens, meaning those aliens defined as excludable 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(1) and subject to immediate exclusion 
and deportation."  Dia Navigation Co., Ltd. v. Reno, 831 F.Supp 
360, 367 (D.N.J. 1993).  Under the district court's reading of 
the statute, once it is conclusively determined that a particular 
alien is a stowaway, because stowaways are not entitled to an 
exclusion hearing, the stowaway becomes a member of a class of 
"excludable" aliens and is therefore "excluded," having become 
subject to immediate exclusion and deportation.  Id.  If asylum 
is not granted, "the stowaway is again able to be deported."  Id. 
at 371.   
 Aliens who apply for asylum, however, cannot be 
deported until their applications have been processed and denied. 
8 U.S.C. § 1105a.  The district court concluded that asylum-
seeking stowaways still fell within the reach of § 1227(a)(1) 
because of that section's provision relating to aliens whose 
deportation has been stayed at the discretion of the Attorney 
General.  Under that reading of the statute, in an instance when 
the Attorney General exercises her discretion and determines that 
"immediate deportation is not practicable or proper": 
[t]he cost of the maintenance including 
detention expenses and expenses incident to 
detention of any such alien while he is being 
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detained shall be borne by the owner or 
owners of the vessel or aircraft on which he 
arrived ... . 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1). 
 Dia's response to this interpretation is that the 
deportation of stowaways who apply for asylum cannot be 
characterized as having been stayed at the discretion of the 
Attorney General.  Instead, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a requires that 
deportation be stayed for all asylum applicants.  Dia's reading 
seems correct, and it reveals a fundamental tension in the 
statutory framework.  Sections 1227(a)(1) and 1323(d) require 
that stowaways be deported immediately unless the Attorney 
General in the exercise of her discretion determines otherwise, 
and § 1227(a)(1) places the burden of deportation, and any 
detention incident to deportation, on the carrier.  Section 
1105a, however, provides that asylum applicants may not be 
deported until their applications have been processed, and this 
is not a matter of discretion.  The statute nowhere addresses the 
question presented here -- the status of an asylum applicant, 
otherwise excluded, pending the processing of the asylum 
application. 
 Presumably the logic of the INS's position is that 
carriers are responsible for the detention of aliens once they 
become "excluded" without regard to what might happen after that 
point.  However, this attempt to reconcile these statutes suffers 
from several flaws.  As noted above, the language of § 1227(a)(1) 
seems to contemplate placing stowaways in the custody of carriers 
only for the short period between the issuance of their 
17 
deportation orders and their immediate deportation; its 
provisions do not encompass situations other than those in which 
deportation is to be "immediate" or more specifically the 
detention of stowaways who apply for asylum.  The INS's reading 
of the statute also creates tension with INS regulations. 
Specifically, 8 C.F.R. § 253.1(f)(3) indicates that a stowaway 
"shall not be excluded or deported before a decision is rendered 
by the Asylum Officer on his asylum application."  Furthermore, 
the backdrop for the present statutory scheme is the repeal of 
§1223, which clearly did place the burden of paying for detention 
on carriers, and a legislative history strongly evincing 
congressional desire to place responsibility for detention on 
INS.  Yet INS relies on § 1227(a)(1), the "immediate deportation" 
provisions, as authority for placing the financial burden of 
detention in asylum-seeking stowaway cases on the carrier.  See 
Legal Opinion of INS Acting General Counsel (January 11, 1991). 
 Turning from the statutory language to the regulations 
we find a similar lack of clear answers.  In response to the User 
Fee Act, INS adopted, pursuant to notice and comment, a rule that 
"addresses the change from carrier responsibility to INS 
responsibility for the custody and detention of excludable 
aliens."  53 Fed. Reg. 1791 (1988) (proposed rule).  See also 54 
Fed. Reg. 100 (1989) (final rule) (characterizing the rule with 
substantially the same language).  Aside from reiterating what 
the statutes make clear--that "[c]arriers become liable for 
detention and transportation expenses immediately upon the 
issuance of a deportation/exclusion order," 54 Fed. Reg. at 100--
18 
the rule does not address the situation with which we are 
currently faced.  Indeed, in response to commenters' concerns 
about detention conditions INS noted that the rule "does not 
address details of specific alien detention conditions.  The 
conditions under which aliens are held would be a matter for 
other proceedings."  Id. at 101.5 
 Dia points to a number of other regulatory provisions 
in support of its contention that the INS policy in this case 
contravenes INS regulations.  Dia directs our attention to 8 
C.F.R. §§ 235.3(e) and 237, both of which indicate that 
"excluded" aliens are to be delivered to the appropriate carrier, 
which becomes responsible for the costs of detention from that 
point.6  In stating that rule, however, the regulation, like 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1), does not provide an answer to the question 
                                                           
5The rule did set forth minimum criteria for INS detention at 
non-INS facilities.  Id.; 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(f).  As counsel 
agreed, however, those criteria do not apply to detention by 
carriers. 
6Section 235.3(e) states: 
[If i]n the opinion of the examining 
immigration officer, it is not practical to 
resolve a question of admissibility at the 
time of arrival of an alien passenger on a 
vessel or aircraft, the officer shall execute 
a Form I-259C to notify the agent, master, or 
commanding officer of the vessel or aircraft, 
if applicable, that the alien passenger may 
be excludable from the United States and in 
the event the alien is formally ordered 
excluded and deported, the carrier will be 
responsible for detention and transportation 
expenses to the last foreign port of 
embarkation as provided in § 237.5 of this 
chapter. 
8 C.F.R. § 235.3(e). 
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of whether carriers are responsible for the costs of detention 
pending the processing of an asylum application. 
 Dia further argues that under 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(d) the 
INS is responsible for the cost of detaining all aliens, except 
"Transit Without Visa" passengers.  The relevant provisions are 
as follows: 
(b) Aliens with no documentation or false 
documentation.  Any alien who appears to the 
inspecting officer to be inadmissible, and 
who arrives without documents ... or who 
arrives with documentation which appears on 
its face to be false, altered, or to relate 
to another person, or who arrives at a place 
other than a designated port of entry, shall 
be detained in accordance with section 235(b) 
[8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)] of the Act.  ... 
 
(c) Aliens with documents.  Any alien who 
appears to the inspecting officer to be 
inadmissible, but who does not fall within 
paragraph (b) of this section, may be 
detained, paroled, or paroled for deferred 
inspection by the inspecting officer.  ... 
(d) Service custody.  The Service will assume 
custody of any alien subject to detention 
under § 235.3 (b) or (c) of this section, 
except in the case of an alien who is 
presented as a Transit Without Visa (TWOV) 
passenger. 
8 C.F.R. § 235.3. 
 Dia points out that this section divides aliens into 
only two categories--those with documents and those without--and 
argues that stowaways clearly will be either one or the other. 
Thus, because the reference in subsection (d) is to "any alien," 
Dia contends that INS is violating its own regulations by not 
taking custody of stowaways who seek asylum. 
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 The government's response to this argument is that the 
statutory provision the rule implements concerns only the 
detention of those aliens "who may not appear to the examining 
immigration officer at the port of arrival to be clearly and 
beyond a doubt entitled to land [and] shall be detained for 
further inquiry to be conducted by a special inquiry officer."  8 
U.S.C. § 1225(b).  In contrast to such aliens, stowaways are 
clearly not entitled to land.  8 U.S.C. § 1323(d).  As such, they 
are not within the ambit of § 1225(b) or 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b), and 
thus 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(d) does not apply.  In addition, we note 
that the regulation by its terms concerns only responsibility for 
the custody of aliens.  As we have explained above, the question 
of custody is distinct from that of financial responsibility and 
is already addressed by the regulations. 
 The inescapable conclusion of our analysis is that no 
clear answer emerges from the statutes and regulations.  Congress 
clearly wished to shift the bulk of financial responsibility for 
detention to INS, but neither the statute nor the legislative 
history provide an indication of whether it wished to shift that 
burden with respect to stowaways who apply for asylum.  The 
question, quite simply, was not answered.  Similarly, the 
regulations evince no consideration of the issue except to the 
extent that INS has reserved the right to force carriers to take 
custody of such aliens.  Moreover, neither the statutes nor the 
regulations address the conditions in which aliens are to be 
detained.  Indeed, the INS at oral argument before us conceded 
that, even though the INS considers § 1227(a)(1) to make more 
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sense when read the government's way, i.e., holding the carrier 
responsible for detention, there's no need to read it that way. 
In light then of the statutory and regulatory language and of the 
INS's concession, we must determine whether INS's position 
regarding carrier responsibility was legitimately adopted. 
III. 
 The APA defines "rule" broadly to include: 
the whole or a part of an agency statement of 
general or particular applicability and 
future effect designed to implement, 
interpret, or prescribe law or policy or 
describing the organization, procedure, or 
practice requirements of an agency and 
includes the approval or prescription for the 
future of rates, wages, corporate or 
financial structures or reorganizations 
thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, 
services or allowances therefor or of 
valuations, costs, or accounting, or 
practices bearing on any of the foregoing. 
5 U.S.C. § 551(4).  In light of this broad definition we think it 
plain that the INS policies at issue in this case constitute 
rules for purposes of the APA. 
 Under the APA,  
[g]eneral notice of proposed rulemaking shall 
be published in the Federal Register, unless 
persons subject thereto are named and either 
personally served or otherwise have actual 
notice thereof in accordance with the law. 
...  Except when notice or hearing is 
required by statute, this subsection does not 
apply-- 
 (A) to interpretative 
rules, general statements of 
policy, or rules of agency 
organization, procedure, or 
practice ... . 
5 U.S.C. § 553(b).  When an agency is required to give notice, it 
must then consider the comments of interested parties upon the 
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proposed rule, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c), and publish the final rule 
within thirty days of its effective date.  5 U.S.C. § 553(d). 
 The distinction between "substantive" or "legislative" 
rules and "interpretive" or "interpretative" rules has proven to 
be one incapable of being drawn with much analytical precision. 
Indeed, courts customarily begin recitations of the law on the 
subject with remarks such as the distinction is "fuzzy," National 
Family Planning and Reproductive Health Ass'n v. Sullivan, 979 
F.2d 227, 231 (D.C. Cir. 1992); "'enshrouded in considerable 
smog,'" La Casa Del Convaleciente v. Sullivan, 965 F.2d 1175, 
1177 (1st Cir. 1992) (quoting General Motors Corp. v. 
Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984)); or "'far from 
crystal clear.'"  Metropolitan Sch. Dist. v. Davila, 969 F.2d 
485, 489 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting Chemical Waste Management, Inc. 
v. EPA, 869 F.2d 1526, 1534 (D.C. Cir. 1989)), cert. denied, 113 
S.Ct. 1360, 122 L.Ed.2d 740 (1993).  And the cases live up to 
this billing, setting forth tests that are often circular and 
usually somewhat Delphic.  Nevertheless, certain principles 
emerge, and, while we are not able to capture their essence any 
more succinctly than our predecessors, we believe their 
application in this case is clear. 
 Our most recent statement of the law on this question 
appeared in FLRA v. Department of the Navy, 966 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 
1992)(in banc).  The critical difference between legislative and 
interpretative rules, we noted, is that the former "have the 
force and effect of law" while the latter do not.  Id. at 762 
n.14.  Stated differently, legislative rules have "substantive 
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legal effect," while interpretative rules typically involve 
construction or clarification of a statute or regulation.  Id. 
See also Bailey v. Sullivan, 885 F.2d 52, 62 (3d Cir. 1989); 
United States v. Walter Dunlap & Sons, Inc., 800 F.2d 1232, 1238 
(3d Cir. 1986).  "If a rule creates rights, assigns duties, or 
imposes obligations, the basic tenor of which is not already 
outlined in the law itself, then it is substantive."  La Casa Del 
Convaleciente, 965 F.2d at 1178.  Put yet another way, 
what distinguishes interpretative from 
legislative rules is the legal base upon 
which the rule rests.  If the rule is based 
on specific statutory provisions, and its 
validity stands or falls on the correctness 
of the agency's interpretation of those 
provisions, it is an interpretative rule. If, 
however, the rule is based on an agency's 
power to exercise its judgment as to how best 
to implement a general statutory mandate, the 
rule is likely a legislative one. 
United Technologies Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714, 719-20 (D.C. Cir. 
1987). 
 Of course as applied to many rules, such statements are 
apt to amount to conclusions about the rule rather than 
principled bases on which to categorize them.  Thus courts have 
inquired into the agency's perception of the rule.  This inquiry 
concerns first the agency's characterization of the rule as 
legislative or interpretative.  See, e.g., Davila, 969 F.2d at 
489; United Technologies, 821 F.2d at 718; Levesque v. Block, 723 
F.2d 175, 182 (1st Cir. 1983); Cerro Metal Prods. v. Marshall, 
620 F.2d 964, 981 (3d Cir. 1980).  The more basic determination, 
however, involves whether "'if by its action the agency intends 
to create new law, rights or duties.'"  United Technologies, 821 
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F.2d at 718 (quoting General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 
F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 
U.S. 1074 (1985)).  See also Daughters of Miriam Center for the 
Aged v. Mathews, 590 F.2d 1250, 1255 n.9 (3d Cir. 1978).  Courts 
have also looked more broadly to "the impact that a given rule 
has on those to whom the rule applies."  Ohio Dep't of Human 
Servs. v. HHS, 862 F.2d 1228, 1233 (6th Cir. 1988).  While the 
substantial impact of a rule is relevant to its classification, 
however, such an impact will not, without more, compel a finding 
that a rule is legislative.  Davila, 969 F.2d at 493; La Casa Del 
Convaleciente, 965 F.2d at 1178. 
 Recognizing that even consideration of all these 
factors will not always lead to a clear determination, we noted 
in FLRA v. Department of the Navy that it is often helpful to 
analyze a rule with an eye to the policies animating the APA's 
notice and comment requirement.  FLRA v. Navy, 966 F.2d at 762 
n.14 (citing Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 705 (D.C. Cir. 
1980)).  As the D.C. Circuit noted in Batterton: "Analysis that 
improves upon semantic play must focus on the underlying purposes 
of the procedural requirements at issue.  The essential purpose 
of according § 553 notice and comment opportunities is to 
reintroduce public participation and fairness to affected parties 
after governmental authority has been delegated to 
unrepresentative agencies."  648 F.2d at 703.  See also Morton v. 
Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232, 94 S.Ct. 1055, 1073 (1974) ("The 
Administrative Procedure Act was adopted to provide, inter alia, 
that administrative policies affecting individual rights and 
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obligations be promulgated pursuant to certain stated procedures 
so as to avoid the inherently arbitrary nature of unpublished ad 
hoc determinations."). 
 Consideration of these factors in the context of this 
case leads us to the conclusion that the INS rules here are 
legislative in nature.  As our analysis in the preceding section 
reveals, the statute simply does not set out a standard 
concerning liability for the costs of detention in cases such as 
this.  Any attempt to divine an answer leads only to the 
conclusion that there is tension if not outright inconsistency 
within the INA to the extent that it can be read as addressing 
the question.  Moreover, there is no suggestion that the statute 
speaks at all to the conditions of detention.  Yet, in the face 
of what is at best statutory ambiguity, INS has adopted rules 
holding carriers liable for unlimited costs of detention and 
imposing custody with no guidelines, or subject only to standards 
as determined by an INS officer on the scene.  This is no less a 
legislative decision than would be the adoption of a detailed 
code concerning the limits and conditions of detention. 
 Our conclusion squares with those of other courts 
confronted with agency implementation of statutes that do not 
address the agency action at issue.  "In the present case, 
'interpretation' could only go so far as to spot the dilemma 
posed by the statutory inconsistency, while legislative-type 
action was required to carry the agency the rest of the way ... 
."  Citizens to Save Spencer County v. EPA, 600 F.2d 844, 879 
(D.C. Cir. 1979).  See also National Family Planning, 979 F.2d at 
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237 (noting that filling in gaps and resolving inconsistencies in 
statutory scheme involves legislative rulemaking); Chamber of 
Commerce v. OSHA, 636 F.2d 464, 469 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("It is 
clear to us that the [agency] has attempted through this 
regulation to supplement the [statute], not simply to construe 
it, and therefore the regulation must be treated as a legislative 
rule.").  The INS has stretched the limits of the INA, without 
the benefit of input from the affected parties, and now contends 
that these parties are without power to challenge its actions. 
This plainly amounts to legislative rulemaking. 
 Our conviction is only strengthened when we consider 
the impact of the INS's rules.  In this case Dia was forced to 
spend a considerable sum of money detaining the four stowaways 
under armed guard in a commercial hotel for 54 days--a period 
which appears to be considerably shorter than is normally needed 
to process asylum applications.  Dia also had to assist the 
stowaways in the preparation of their applications, which 
included hiring an interpreter.  Perhaps most significantly, Dia 
was forced to deal with a suicidal stowaway on a hunger strike, 
with the resulting use of leg irons.  This was certainly a less-
than-ideal situation for both Dia and the stowaway, and perhaps 
for the other guests at the Holiday Inn, but the INS refused to 
assume custody.  Episodes such as this appear to be what 
motivated Congress to enact the User Fee Statute and require the 
INS to take custody of aliens. 
 In sum, we hold that, if the INS wishes to impose on 
private carriers the costs of detaining stowaways who have 
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applied for asylum, it must do so pursuant to the notice and 
comment requirements of the APA.  Moreover, because the decision 
to impose custody and/or the costs of detention on carriers 
necessarily involves some decision as to the extent and 
conditions of these obligations, the INS must adopt its rules, 
governing these issues and setting forth how questions concerning 
the extent and conditions of detention will be answered, pursuant 
to notice and comment. 
 Because the INS has not conformed with the requirements 
of the APA in establishing its policy on the costs and conditions 
of detention of asylum-seeking stowaways pending a decision on 
the asylum application, the district court erred in failing to 
grant that portion of Dia's motion for a declaratory judgment to 
that effect. 
IV. 
 We now turn briefly to Dia's claims for reimbursement 
of its expenses in detaining the stowaways.  Dia argues that it 
is entitled to reimbursement under the APA and under the Tucker 
Act.  We believe the district court correctly concluded that Dia 
may not recover its expenses under either of these statutes. 
 A. The APA 
 Dia first claims that it is entitled to reimbursement 
under § 702 of the APA.  That section provides in part: 
 A person suffering legal wrong because 
of agency action, or adversely affected or 
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning 
of a relevant statute, is entitled to 
judicial review thereof.  An action in a 
court of the United States seeking relief 
other than money damages and stating a claim 
28 
that an agency or an officer or employee 
thereof acted or failed to act in an official 
capacity or under color of legal authority 
shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be 
denied on the ground that it is against the 
United States or that the United States is an 
indispensable party. 
5 U.S.C. § 702 (emphasis added).  The district court found that 
the relief Dia seeks qualifies as money damages for purposes of 
this section, Dia, 831 F.Supp. at 378-80, and that as a result 
recovery is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  Id. 
The government urges us to adopt this analysis. 
 In Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 108 S.Ct. 
2722, 101 L.Ed.2d 749 (1988), the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he 
fact that a judicial remedy may require one party to pay money to 
another is not a sufficient reason to characterize the relief as 
'money damages.'"  Id. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2732.  In Bowen the 
state of Massachusetts sued the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services to enforce a provision of the Medicaid Act which 
required payment of certain amounts to the state for Medicaid 
services.  The Court noted that Massachusetts' suit 
is not a suit seeking money in compensation 
for the damage sustained by the failure of 
the Federal Government to pay as mandated; 
rather, it is a suit seeking to enforce the 
statutory mandate itself, which happens to be 
one for the payment of money.  The fact that 
the mandate is one for the payment of money 
must not be confused with the question 
whether such payment, in these circumstances, 
is a payment of money as damages or as 
specific relief. 
Id. at 900-01, 108 S.Ct. at 2735.  The Court concluded that 
"since the [district court's] orders are for specific relief 
(they undo the Secretary's refusal to reimburse the State) rather 
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than for money damages (they do not provide relief that 
substitutes for that which ought to have been done) they are 
within the District Court's jurisdiction under § 702's waiver of 
sovereign immunity."  Id. at 910, 108 S.Ct. at 2740. 
 Following the Supreme Court's lead, this court has 
similarly determined that a monetary award can in some instances 
constitute equitable relief rather than money damages for 
purposes of § 702.  See Zellous v. Broadhead Assocs., 906 F.2d 94 
(3d Cir. 1990).  Other courts have reached the same conclusion. 
See, e.g., Esch v. Yeutter, 876 F.2d 976, 984 (D.C.Cir. 1989); 
Beverly Hospital v. Bowen, 872 F.2d 483, 487 (D.C.Cir. 1989).  As 
the district court concluded, "all of these cases have concerned 
some form of statutory entitlement to monetary relief."  Dia, 831 
F.Supp. at 378.  The crucial distinction involves whether a 
claimant "'is seeking funds to which a statute allegedly entitles 
it, rather than money for the losses ... suffered by virtue of'" 
the agency's failure to do that which it was required to do. 
Bowen, 487 U.S. at 901, 108 S.Ct. at 2735 (quoting Maryland Dept. 
of Human Resources v. Department of Health and Human Services, 
763 F.2d 1441, 1446 (D.C.Cir. 1985)). 
 In this case the reimbursement Dia seeks falls squarely 
within the category of "money damages" as prior case law has 
defined that term.  The INA simply does not speak to the question 
of responsibility for the costs of detention of stowaways who 
apply for asylum.  Thus there is no statutory entitlement to 
these funds.  Instead, Congress has explicitly given the INS the 
authority to promulgate regulations as it deems necessary in 
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implementing the INA.  8 U.S.C. § 1103.  The entitlement to these 
costs, then, must originate from INS rather than from a court 
that lacks the requisite expertise and information to craft an 
appropriate standard.  Indeed, were we to fashion a rule out of 
Congress' silence simply because Dia has alleged a statutory 
entitlement we would not only be usurping the role of the agency 
but also inviting parties to use § 702 to circumvent 
administrative agencies in favor of the courts.  We cannot allow 
the identity of the decisionmaker to be determined by crafty 
lawyering.  Cf. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 915-16, 108 S.Ct. at 2743 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 As we view this case, the wrong that Dia has suffered 
is not the denial of money to which the INA entitles it, but 
rather the INS' failure to follow the appropriate procedures in 
implementing the INA.  An award of money in these circumstances 
could only be characterized as a substitute for what ought to 
have been done, and therefore would constitute money damages.  As 
such, Dia's claim is barred by the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity. 
 B. The Tucker Act 
 The district court dismissed Dia's Tucker Act claim on 
the ground that it lacks substantive merit.  Dia, 831 F.Supp. at 
380 n.40.  We conclude that the district court correctly 
dismissed this claim, though we do not reach the merits of the 
claim because we hold that the district court lacked jurisdiction 
over it. 
 As our prior cases make clear: 
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Under the Tucker Act, the United States 
Claims Court and district courts share 
original jurisdiction over non-tort monetary 
claims against the United States not 
exceeding $10,000.  28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) 
(sometimes referred to as the "Little Tucker 
Act").  Original jurisdiction over such 
claims seeking more than $10,000 vests 
exclusively in the Claims Court.  28 U.S.C. 
§1491 (the so-called "Big Tucker Act"). 
Chabal v. Reagan, 822 F.2d 349, 353 (3d Cir. 1987).  See also 
United States v. Hohri, 482 U.S. 64, 67 n.1, 107 S.Ct. 2246, 2249 
n.1, 96 L.Ed.2d 51 (1987); Livera v. First Nat'l State Bank of 
N.J., 879 F.2d 1186, 1195 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Livera 
v. Small Business Admin., 493 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 332, 107 
L.Ed.2d 322 (1989); Hahn v. United States, 757 F.2d 581, 585-86 
(3d Cir. 1985). 
 Dia asserts that the Claims Court's exclusive 
jurisdiction is overridden by the Supplemental Jurisdiction Act. 
28 U.S.C. § 1367.  We reject this argument in light of the Tucker 
Act's explicit jurisdictional bar.  See Pershing Div. of 
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Secs. Corp. v. United States, --F.3d 
---, 1994 WL 153956, *1-2 (7th Cir. 1994).  Dia has alleged 
damages amounting to $127,580, far in excess of the maximum claim 
over which the district court could exercise its jurisdiction. 
The district court therefore properly dismissed this claim. 
V. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the district 
court's order, dismissing Dia's complaint, and we will remand 
this case to the district court to award a declaratory judgment 
in favor of Dia on its claim that the INS policy on the costs and 
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conditions of detention of asylum-seeking stowaways is invalid 
for failure to comply with the notice and comment procedures of  
 
the APA.  We will affirm the order of the district court insofar 
as it dismissed Dia's other claims, including its claim for 
monetary relief. 
